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How and when do we learn to understand other people’s perspectives and possibly
divergent beliefs? This question has elicited much theoretical and empirical research.
A puzzling finding has been that toddlers perform well on so-called implicit false belief
(FB) tasks but do not show such capacities on traditional explicit FB tasks. I propose
a navigational approach, which offers a hitherto ignored way of making sense of the
seemingly contradictory results. The proposal involves a distinction between how we
navigate FBs as they relate to (1) our current affordances (here & now navigation) as
opposed to (2) presently non-actual relations, where we need to leave our concrete
embodied/situated viewpoint (counterfactual navigation). It is proposed that whereas
toddlers seem able to understand FBs in their current affordance space, they do not
yet possess the resources to navigate in abstraction from such concrete affordances,
which explicit FB tests seem to require. It is hypothesized that counterfactual navigation
depends on the development of “sensorimotor priors,” i.e., statistical expectations of
own kinesthetic re-afference, which evidence now suggests matures around age four,
consistent with core findings of explicit FB performance.
Keywords: affordances, false belief test, metacognition, sensorimotor priors, developmental psychology,
embodied cognition, theory of mind, social cognition
FALSE BELIEF TESTS AND CONFLICTING EXPLICIT AND
IMPLICIT FINDINGS
The question of how and when children learn to understand
other people’s beliefs and perspectives has long been an object
of study and philosophical debate. Many experimental paradigms
use false belief (FB) scenarios to test this development. Typical
FB paradigms set up a discrepancy between a test subject’s accu-
rate information about a scenario and a divergent perspective,
which then is used to probe whether the false perceptive of the
other is taken into account. Interestingly so-called “explicit” and
“implicit” categories of FB tests each consistently point to very
different minimal ages for the development of FB abilities.
Explicit FB tests can be exemplified by the Sally-Anne task
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), which involves a presented story with
two protagonists Sally and Anne. The FB discrepancy is set up
as the test subject watches that Sally puts a marble in location A
and leaves, whereupon Anne unbeknownst to Sally transfers the
marble to location B. The experimenter/story-teller then prompts
the test subject to anticipate an action by the mislead Sally. e.g.,
“Where do you think Sally would look for her toy?” Researchers
have overwhelmingly found that typically developing (TD) chil-
dren generally do not “pass” this kind of FB test before about age
four or older. Younger children have a strong tendency to suggest
the current toy-location rather than where Sally left it (Wellman
et al., 2001). If one assumes the test tracks abilities to under-
stand “beliefs,” then results indicate that TD kids cannot handle
others’ beliefs before age four. Accordingly, failing to produce
the correct answer has been interpreted as revealing either a
categorical inability to understand minds (Baron-Cohen, 1995),
or performance difficulties with linguistic aspects and/or with
prioritizing and using FB information executively over current
factual information (Moses et al., 2005; Carruthers, 2013).
Conclusions of relative “mind-blindness” in toddlers have
been challenged by various so-called “implicit” experimental
paradigms, showing that children seem to track and form FB
expectations much earlier. These studies use non-verbal/active
participation FB tasks, relying on either looking-time (Onishi and
Baillargeon, 2005), communicative reference (Southgate et al.,
2010) or helping paradigms (Buttelmann et al., 2009; Knudsen
and Liszkowski, 2010, 2012). These paradigms do not explicitly
ask the child about expected actions of another agent, but rather
measures whether their own action selections vary significantly
with respectively true/false belief conditions of observed others.
e.g., in Buttelmann et al.’s helping paradigm the test subject is
invited to open either of two boxes given a manipulation where,
during the crucial toy transfer, an experimenter is observed either
staying in the room (true belief) or leaving (FB). The remark-
able finding was that even 18 months-olds varied their box choice
significantly with the manipulation of the experimenters “belief
scenario.” Thus, the results suggested that toddlers might indeed
understand FBs. Looking-time paradigms indicate FB under-
standing perhaps as early as 9–15 months (Baillargeon et al.,
2010; see also Reddy, 2008), but I focus uniquely on the help-
ing paradigm and the specific puzzle of why 18–30 month-old
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toddlers appropriately vary their behavior according to perceived
FBs (and also handle object permanence and pretense play), and
yet consistently fail Sally-Anne style FB tests.
In addition to the age disparities between Sally-Anne and
the helping-paradigm FB findings, the labels of implicit/explicit
and their core experimental differences are not easily conceptual-
ized, as discussed by Carruthers (2013). Existing theories often
distinguish information types of FB tasks; i.e., mental, counter-
factual, linguistic, conceptual, representational, etc. and theorize
the domain-specific or domain-general capacities needed to han-
dle these kinds of information. Further, debates often center on
whether the observed infant/toddler capacities should be inter-
preted as based on mindreading or on behavioral rules (Knudsen
and Liszkowski, 2010; Perner, 2010; Carruthers, 2013).
This perspective article points to an alternative framework for
theorizing the Sally-Anne and helping-paradigm and the devel-
opmental processes underlying the discrepancy of their findings.
Given the short format I do not argue against any existing the-
ory, but rather propose that a sensorimotor maturation-based
explanation would expand the existing interpretive possibility
space, as mental processes are modeled differently than current
categorizations imply.
The core proposal is that the age discrepancy of FB findings
might be rooted in sensorimotor maturation processes taking
place around age four, as these might ground the relevant cog-
nitive developments documented at this age. It is suggested that
the helping and Sally-Anne paradigms might require different
kinds of “navigation,” which again depends on different levels of
sensorimotor maturation. More precisely a distinction is drawn
between the ability to navigate presently available “here & now”
perceptual space vs. navigating an imagined, remembered or oth-
erwise currently counterfactual bodily space. The latter ability to
“navigate beyond the here & now” is hypothesized to depend
on late-developing predictable movement variations, and further
that such abilities support successful Sally-Anne FB performance.
By contrast it is proposed that helping paradigm FB tasks are
based on the child’s understanding of the “here & now” social
affordance space and thus can be navigated without this aspect of
sensorimotor maturation. To explain this unexplored possibility
and theorize the distinction between here & now and counterfac-
tual navigation, we need to look to neuroscientific evidence for
(1) affordance tracking and decision-making, (2) default systems
and self-projection and lastly (3) the maturation of sensorimotor
priors.
DECISION-MAKING AND NAVIGATION OF “HERE & NOW”
AFFORDANCES
The idea that we track multiple affordances, i.e., perceived action
possibilities in the “engageable” space around us, is not new
(Gibson, 1977). Recently, the affordance notion has attracted
renewed attention, through theories (Heft, 2003; Gallagher, 2005;
Rietveld, 2008; De Jaegher et al., 2010), but also via neuroscientific
discoveries about cortical fronto-parietal sensorimotor processes
and massively parallel and dynamic circuits mediated by cortical
and sub-cortical circuits (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010) and advances
in e.g., robotics (Horton et al., 2012) where these kinds of ecologi-
cal agent-environment relations have begun to replace traditional
input-output representational frameworks. Cisek and Kalaska
point to findings that sensorimotor processes are engaged early, in
parallel and support not only action execution but also decision-
making and action selection between multiple tracked options.
They argue these findings of early and parallel affordance tracking
are inconsistent with modular input-output information process-
ing frameworks. Further, mirror neuron research has shown that
we track object affordances as they relate to perceived others, as
well as complex and dynamic social affordances between self and
other (Casile et al., 2011; Sartori et al., 2012).
Thus, in opposition to classic notions of the mind as entirely
hidden or “sandwiched” between action and perception (Hurley,
2001), a relational affordance story lets decision-making pro-
cesses partially reveal themselves through not only actual but
possible engagements with our environment. On a theoretical
level such findings complicate our notion of social perception, as
we see not only the actual behaviors of others, but their poten-
tial and afforded action targets, and how these relate to our own
current action in overall shared affordance space. The key is that
affordances alert to potential outcomes as they relate to actual
objects and agents in the spatial environment.
Carruthers (2013) hypothesizes that FB abilities require a
“domain specific mindreading module” (tracking other’s goals,
beliefs etc.), domain general planning, and decision-making abil-
ities (own action selection) plus belief attribution processes. But
the question is if we need to postulate a separate “mindreading
module” and attribution processes for FB understanding. If sen-
sorimotor processes ground a complex and dynamic tracking of
current affordance relations of self and other (Trevarthen, 1979;
De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; Gallagher, 2012), then might we
not oftentimes understand goals and FBs of interaction partners
though this tracking of their actions and affordances and how
they differ from and dynamically modulate our own?
Fronto-parietal processes have been found to support not only
action planning and decision-making but also perception of the
affordances of others. Notably these circuits show complex and
dynamic properties, as affordances can be social, visible or hid-
den (e.g., Umilta et al., 2001). Further, the complexities of our
context relations undergo various crucial maturation processes,
particularly in the first years of life as evidenced by “A-not-B-
error” (Smith and Thelen, 2003) and pretense play studies (Leslie,
1987) etc. For our present purposes we should note that affor-
dances and thus action planning of 2–3 year-old toddlers is
not necessarily restricted to what is presently sensed, but rather
to that which offers our spatially situated bodies sensorimotor
engagement. Thus, the door behind us might still be tracked as
an afforded “escape-route” even if currently unseen. Similarly,
a pretend banana, which is not actually there, can–as spatially
actable—be part of the shared affordance space and must com-
ply with certain rules of engagement. Research on mirror neuron
circuits also indicates that others’ actions and affordances are
dynamically integrated into this affordance space understand-
ing (Caggiano et al., 2009; Sartori et al., 2012). The “here &
now” affordance space might thus contain counterfactual and
prospective teleological elements—such as unseen and pretense
affordances or others’ falsely maintained affordances—as long as
these are placed in relation to embodied agents (Gibson, 1977;
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Brincker, 2010, 2012). A source of complexity is that limits to the
current affordance space are fluid, but it is an empirical question
how far from our current position our skilled, cultured, and tool-
enhanced bodies can track own and shared potentialities (Iriki,
2006).
In sum, the proposal is that we reach boxes, answer questions,
and point to hidden marbles via a “here & now” affordance space,
and further that FBs of others might, as long as they relate to the
space we concretely inhabit, be understood, tracked, and engaged
through our affordance space understanding.
Looking at the typical helping paradigms, they allow the child
to incorporate relevant past and present perspectives of others
into their present scenario, without requiring them to abstract
from their embodied relation to it. e.g., 18/30 month-olds in
the Buttelmann et al. study must integrate contrasting perspec-
tives and “false beliefs” of others within their affordance space.
However, they need not let go of their pragmatic relations to this
current space to perform the task. Thus, it can be interpreted as
“here & now” social navigation incorporating FB content in their
actual body space.
In Sally-Anne style tests on the other hand, toddlers might
be aware that Sally doesn’t know and yet still not pass the test.
Perhaps they even have extra difficulties not sharing the true
location of the marble precisely because they know Sally doesn’t
know where it is. In navigational terms, passing the Sally-Anne
test requires a child–beyond linguistic skills—to be able to handle
the conflicting pragmatic contexts of the marble hunt story and the
experimenter-meta-question. To pass this test one might need to
(1) understand and remember Sally’s perspective, but also—and
this is where we seem to move beyond the here & now—(2) nav-
igate the situation from her counterfactual vantage-point, which
involves momentarily setting aside one’s current position in rela-
tion to the marble, and finally (3) to return to the verbal prompt
and respond to what Sally would have done (had we not been
there to help her). Each of these subsequent aspects contribute to
the complexity of this highly non-cooperative scenario where one
in addition to including the other’s perspective, also must exclude
one’s own embodied knowledge, and navigate both via the current
affordance space and beyond it.
SELF-PROJECTION AND NAVIGATING BEYOND THE “HERE &
NOW”
In contrast to here & now navigation, we sometimes—typically
in our thoughts–engage in what we might call counterfactual
navigation. i.e., when we place ourselves in remembered, imag-
ined or otherwise not-actually-bodily-inhabited-spaces to use the
resulting relational body-space understanding for various deliber-
ations. The key is that it is the relation that is counterfactual, not
the information or the objective existence of the space. Thus, such
navigation goes beyond merely including counterfactual infor-
mation, i.e., memories, perspectives or pretense objects, in our
actually inhabited space and situated action choices. Rather it is
about “placing oneself” and “making moves” via a space, which–
although perhaps factually existing—is pragmatically counterfac-
tual, and requires one to abstract from actual embodied relations
to the current affordance space.
In terms of Sally-Anne tasks, one might thus be able to track
Sally’s FB in the current affordance space, but unable to plan a
response from Sally’s perspective and/or shift back and verbalize
it in the prompt context, which requires one to ignore the current
position of the marble as it relates to both oneself and Sally (see
Bloom and German, 2000; Rubio-Fernández and Geurts, 2013 for
Sally-Anne variations that probe some of these behavioral com-
plexities and age limitations). Own prior beliefs and misperceived
affordances might also under some conditions require counter-
factual navigation, as in e.g., the Smarties box/ appearance-reality
paradigms (Gopnik and Aslington, 1988). In short, task aspects of
planning, deciding and inferring via remembered/projected sce-
narios can all be interpreted as involving navigating beyond the
current affordance space, as one needs to relate to options, which
cannot be interpreted through the sensorimotor affordance space
that our situated bodies are actually dwelling in.
The idea of such counterfactual navigation differs from tra-
ditional modular, non-relational, and knowledge-focused aspects
of “theory of mind” theories (e.g., Leslie et al., 2004; Carruthers,
2013), as no domain specific mindreading or ToM module is
postulated. Rather the crucial distinction of the navigational
hypothesis pertains not to the other mind content per se but rather
to how it is presented, assessed or navigated by the understand-
ing subject. Similarly, though there are parallels between the idea
of counterfactual navigation and that of off-line simulation (e.g.,
Heal, 1996; Goldman, 2006), an important contrast is that coun-
terfactual content or “pretense” can play a role in both kinds of
navigation. Thus, specific overlaps and contrasts exist to aspects
of traditional theory, ToMM etc.
Interestingly, the core cortical areas implicated in much social
cognitive research of “theory of mind” have been found to over-
lap greatly with the default-mode network (Schilbach et al.,
2008). The default mode network was precisely isolated due to
its sustained activity in the absence of current external-directed
attention and stimuli (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001), and has
been interpreted as supporting various kinds of “self-projection”
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007) or “internal mentation” (Andrews-
Hanna, 2012), whether these pertain to social cognition, memory
or future projection. In other words, it fits with a notion of
navigation beyond the here & now.
Another line of social cognitive research that could be reinter-
preted within a navigation framework is the role of the rTPJ in
thinking about other minds. This cortical region has been con-
sistently implicated in imaging studies and thus on a modular
account proposed to support “theory of mind” (Saxe and Wexler,
2005). However, another possibility is that the region is important
for shifting between here & now navigation and counterfac-
tual navigation. This hypothesis would fit with broader evidence
regarding the role of the rTPJ in attentional shifts (Mitchell,
2008).
These preliminary notes are meant simply to highlight that
the navigation hypothesis throws a new light on existing imaging
findings and most importantly is empirically tractable.
MATURATION OF SENSORIMOTOR PRIORS AND
COUNTERFACTUAL NAVIGATING
The distinction between these two kinds of navigation is pro-
posed as a new interpretation of the age discrepancy of implicit vs.
explicit FB tests. The idea is that what is maturing around age four
might not be the ability to represent minds, non-current facts or
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that others have counterfactual beliefs. Rather the proposal is that
a counterfactual use of one’s embodied learning becomes possi-
ble, which again allows for ignoring “here & now” perspectival
affordances and for acting on the basis of a navigation of coun-
terfactual space. Toddlers are typically capable of remembering,
making predictions, telling us what we don’t know etc., and they
actively do so in present contexts (Poulin-Dubois et al., 2007;
Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). What the smaller children might
not be able to do is pragmatically navigating counterfactual ter-
rains. The hypothesis is thus that non-current information only
can take on the needed affordance organization for action choice
in relation to their current body.
But why would the counterfactual navigation not be available
to toddlers? In other words, according to the navigation hypoth-
esis what is the crucial maturation that happens around age four?
Recent experimental data from Elizabeth Torres’ sensorimotor lab
points to a fascinating answer. She found that typically develop-
ing (TD) 3-year-olds do not yet have statistical predictability of
temporal features of their limb movements (Torres et al., 2013).
One might say that they do not yet have “sensorimotor priors”
with respect to their own bodily movements and their ensuing re-
afferent sensations (Von Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950). Notably,
Torres found that handmovement variations go through a crucial
maturation precisely around age four. More specifically the vari-
ations are noisy and random in toddlers but then begin to show
predictability and better signal-to-noise ratios in the 4 year-olds.
These are remarkable findings and their potential goes beyond
this current project. The hypothesis that I would like to bring
attention to here is that such “sensorimotor priors” can precisely
be seen as a kind of predictable probabilistic body, an abstract
body that we can “bring into” counterfactual scenarios and thus
use to navigate and make decisions in spaces we do not stand in
current embodied relations to. The idea is that only when we have
established a reliable and predictable baseline expectation about
our own re-afferent movements, can we use these hypothetically.
In other words, sensorimotor priors as such embodied expecta-
tions might ground abstract navigational relations to non-present
spaces, and thus allow us to navigate beyond the pragmatic rela-
tions of our actually situated bodies. Torres further found that
this sensorimotor maturation does not follow the usual trajectory
in individuals with autism—which suggests that they have to rely
on their “here & now” body and world sensation in very differ-
ent ways than TD children, and offers a new perspective on their
social interaction and FB task difficulties (Brincker and Torres,
2013; Torres, 2013; Torres et al., 2013).
Thus, the proposal is that typical 2–3 year-olds can engage
in elaborate pretense incorporating hypothetical content such as
memories, fantasy objects and alternative perspectives in their
present affordance space, relating to their bodies and sensori-
motor capabilities. But they might not have the statistical body
expectations needed to navigate counterfactual spaces “in their
head” so to speak. The proposal is thus that the helping paradigm
does indeed show early understanding of FBs, but not the ability
to go beyond the current affordance relations to counterfactual
spaces or mental navigation, which seems to be needed in the tra-
ditional Sally-Anne task. Under this framework, the development
of sensorimotor priors around age four might transform some
here & now social knowledge and interactions, but does not move
the child from “mind-blindness” to “mindreading.”
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